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11 Introduction
Evidence of widespread traﬃcking of human beings in spite of the introduction of restrictive asylum
policies indicates that there is a possible distortional element between asylum law and the incentives
it gives to refugees. A priory, restrictive asylum laws should have a dissuading eﬀect on refugees. In
this paper we address the following question: are restrictive asylum policies eﬀective, given human
traﬃcking?
In order to provide an answer to this question, we need to determine a) the goals of asylum
policy, b) the measures taken, and c) the environment that they are applied in. In this introduction,
we review the contributions of the empirical literature on these three points, in view of formalizing
their main features in section 2. The results will be discussed in section 3.
1.1 The goals of asylum policy
Asylum policies have two types of goals. On the one hand, governments continue to state the
importance of providing asylum to human beings suﬀering from persecution. There is some proof
that the willingness to take responsibility for refugees is more than lip service. The ratiﬁcation
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and of the 1967 Protocol on the Status
of Refugees, the fact that the right to asylum is part of the German constitution, as well as the
history of hosting asylum seekers in Europe, are examples of the engagement of countries in favor
of refugees.
On the other hand, it appears that the principal aim of current asylum laws is to reduce the
number of asylum seekers.1 Governments seem to want to prevent their countries receiving a dispro-
portional share of asylum seekers, and to show that they are regaining control over immigration.2
The aim of reducing the numbers of asylum seekers is also reﬂected in practice. Since the early
1990s, policy measures predominantly restrict all types of rights of asylum seekers (see ﬁgure 1.1).
It has been suggested that the reduction of the rights of asylum seekers has become a priority,
and that the right to asylum applies only to those who manage to enter the system in spite of all
the restrictive measures.3 However, for the purpose of this paper, we can assume that both the
reduction of the number of asylum seekers and humanitarian considerations are the main goals of
the restrictive asylum policy measures.
1For example, in May 2002 Tony Blair announced that he would personally take control of asylum policies
in order to reduce the number of claims in the UK. See Gibney (2004), p. 121.
2Gibney (2004), p. 220-221.
3“(T)hat some lucky individuals manage to slip through the net of restrictionism and ultimately gain
refugee status (or some other form of protection) is taken as evidence by government that the institution of



































































Figure 1: Average number of new restrictive asylum policies in the EU, 1980-1999
31.2 Asylum policy measures
Following Eﬁonayi-M¨ ader et al. (2001) and Hatton (2004), we divide asylum policies into the four
groups of measures: access restrictions, reforms of the asylum procedure, living conditions and
expulsions. We discuss each of these types of measures in turn.
1.2.1 Access restrictions
The European Union oﬀers few or no means for refugees to enter its territory: no “visa for refugees”
exists in order to enter the territory and to claim asylum.4 On the contrary, measures are intro-
duced explicitly in order to prevent the arrival of these persons, thus eliminating the possibility of
immigrating legally.5 They include for example a restriction in the number of visas granted, an
increase of border controls, carrier responsibility, and penalizing the transportation of all illegal
immigrants to national territory. In the next section, these access restriction policy measures will
be summarized by the parameter C.
What is the eﬀect of policies restricting access found in the literature? Studying the convergence
in time of the introduction of these measures and the decrease in the number of asylum claims,
Eﬁonayi-M¨ ader et al. (2001) ﬁnd that restrictions of access are in fact often followed by a decrease
in the number of asylum claims. Hatton (2004) shows empirically that this category of policy has
the consequence to reduce a large part of asylum seeker ﬂows. Zetter et al. (2003) arrive at similar
conclusions.
However, according to B¨ ocker and Havinga (1997), the consequences of this category of policy
and the results of the studies quoted above are limited. The authors ﬁnd that the introduction of
supplementary visas and carrier sanctions increase the diﬃculty and the expense of the voyage to
the destination country, but that the eﬀect on the ﬂow of asylum seekers is limited to the short
term. Also, it has an impact on the number of persons only from certain countries of origin. Means
of avoiding new obstacles to illegal immigration that are introduced with these policies are found
rapidly, reducing their eﬀect. In fact, a large majority of asylum seekers enter the territory illegally.6
In order to do this, refugees are more and more forced to use human smugglers, as we will see below.
4There exists a programme that allows recognized refugees who apply for asylum in a UNHCR refugee
camp outside Europe to enter a European country. However, fearing for their security in these camps, few
refugees choose this option. The number of people admitted to Europe by these means is derisory (Middleton,
2005, p. 6). For example, in 2001 Germany, France and Great Britain hosted 317 persons sent through the
program, while they were faced with 227 575 asylum claims from persons who had entered the countries
illegally.
5See Morrisson and Crosland (2000), p. 27-28 and Brolan (2003), p. 574.
6B¨ ocker and Havinga (1997), p. 15-16.
41.2.2 Reforms of the asylum procedure
One can make out two main tendencies for asylum procedure policies: the extension of the types of
reasons for exclusion from the procedure, and the multiplication of complementary statuses to the
Geneva Convention status.
All EU member countries established lists of “safe countries of origin” and of “safe countries
of transit”7. Further criteria for accessing the asylum procedure were added: documents must
be complete and correct, and “manifestly unfounded claims” were introduced as a new category.
Accelerated and speciﬁc procedures are created with limited appeal rights, for example airport
procedures. A number of bi- and multilateral treaties of processing of asylum seekers were signed,
making it possible to return refugees to countries outside the European Union.
With the war in Yugoslavia a wave of adoption of temporary protection statuses started. With
the non-eligibility of certain categories of refugees for the recognized refugee status, the recognition
rate of asylum claims has decreased dramatically.
In his statistical study, Hatton (2004) ﬁnds that this type of policy does not have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the number of asylum seekers. This a priori surprising result is conﬁrmed by the work of
B¨ ocker and Havinga (1997), who ﬁnd that the lists of safe countries are avoided by refugees simply
by not disclosing their countries of origin and transit to the authorities. However, the recognition
rates are shown to have an impact on the destination country choice of refugees for certain countries
of origin and destination.
In the formalization of the following section, the asylum law procedure is reﬂected in the prob-
ability that an asylum claim is accepted. It is composed of the parameter ρ, multiplied by the
individual history, or “proﬁle” (θi). For example, excluding certain categories of asylum seekers
from asylum eligibility would be interpreted as a “toughening” of the recognition policy and reduce
ρ. As a consequence, one would expect the probability of recognition to decrease. Also, for a given
acceptance policy ρ, a refugee who can prove that he8 fulﬁlls the criteria for a refugee status (see
below) has a greater probability of being granted asylum than a person who does not fulﬁll some
of the criteria.
1.2.3 Living conditions
From the mid-1990s, internal controls and limitations of asylum seekers’ social rights where mul-
tiplied. For example, there was an increased eﬀort to detect “disappeared” asylum seekers and to
prevent abuse of the asylum system. This category of policies implies to penalize lack of cooperation
7Countries are considered “safe” depending on the number of asylum seekers originating from them, the
human rights record and the democratic character of their institutions. The criteria for including a country
in the list of safe countries are vague, and there is frequent disagreement about which countries to include.
8The majority of refugees are male. For example, in Germany in 2006, 60,7% of asylum claimants were
male (BAMF, 2007, p.24). For simplicity, we will use the pronoun ’he’ throughout this paper.
5with the authorities and antisocial behavior. Beneﬁt payments were reduced, centralized housing
was made compulsory and mobility was limited. Asylum seeker beneﬁts were taken out of the social
beneﬁts systems and frequently paid in kind or in vouchers. Dispersion and detention policies were
introduced and paid work forbidden for many categories of asylum seekers.
These measures reduce the monetary gains to a strict minimum. According to the neoclassical
migration theory9, that emphasizes the role of expected income in the destination country, they
should reduce therefore the attractive force of a country. A reduction in social aids aims also to
reduce the expenses of asylum seekers to the state.
Hatton (2004) shows that measures reducing living conditions for asylum seekers, introduced in
great number in the 1990s, do indeed have a signiﬁcant impact on the number of asylum claims.
However, the qualitative studies show the necessity of nuancing this result: while certain groups of
refugees appreciate housing, others prefer to minimize government intervention in their lives. Most
persons interviewed by B¨ ocker and Havinga (1997) consider it highly undesirable to depend on state
aid in the long term. Nonetheless, in the short term, the living conditions provided by the host
country are deemed important.
In the next section, we introduce a parameter β for asylum seeker beneﬁts, which is designed
to reﬂect the living conditions of refugees. We assume that higher beneﬁts β generally increase the
refugees’ utility.
1.2.4 Expulsions
Hosting persons in need of aid is generally seen as acceptable on the condition that those who are
seen as abusing of the system are expelled.10 Considerable eﬀorts are made to give asylum seekers
incentives to voluntarily return to their home countries. Among these are material incentives and
professional education programs, but also diplomatic advances which make it easier to procure the
necessary documents. Failed asylum seekers that do not return voluntarily can be removed or not.11
Over the last three decades, the number of expulsions was multiplied in several countries.
The rise in rates of expulsion aims to increase the risk for refugees of ﬁnding themselves back
at the starting point of their journey. More seriously, they risk being exposed to the authorities in
9See Borjas (1994), Sjaastad (1962), Todaro (1969), Harris and Todaro (1970). The existing microeco-
nomic models of individual choice are based around the concepts of investment and human capital, where
decisions of rational individuals depend on a cost-beneﬁt analysis: they decide to emigrate when the expected
net gain from doing so is positive. Migrants must make investments in terms of time and money in order to
be able to work in a country where they can be more productive and better paid. Given that many asylum
seekers are prohibited from working legally, it becomes clear that the models of existing economic literature
are not directly adaptable to the case of asylum immigration.
10For an example, see Home Oﬃce (2005), p. 8.
11In the UK, for example, only 43% of rejected asylum seekers were removed in 2003. Calculated with
ﬁgures from Home Oﬃce (2003).
6their countries of origin that are responsible for their persecution, or that are at least not capable
of protecting them from persecution.
In the literature, the eﬀect of this type of policy was not tested separately in a regression. The
qualitative study by B¨ ocker and Havinga (1997) insists on the importance to refugees of being able
to stay in the country of refuge, whatever their status. A high rate of expulsion threatens this
decision factor.
In what follows, the probability of expulsion will be noted π, and it is assumed to reduce asylum
seekers’ utility. Furthermore, we hold that the probability of being expelled by the state is higher
for asylum seekers than for illegal immigrants. The estimations of the rate of removals conﬁrm this
hypothesis.12 For simplicity, we set the probability of being expelled to zero for illegal immigrants.
We assume that they are not discovered.
This review of the literature shows that according to quantitative and qualitative studies the dif-
ferent asylum policy measures do not always have the impact that they were designed for. Predicting
the consequences of measures is shown as extremely complex, because of signiﬁcant variations of
behavior following the countries of origin and destination, and the short and the long term.
It is nonetheless surprising that the regressions ﬁnd that measures impacting procedures and
living conditions have no impact on asylum seekers’ choices. It can be considered rational for them
to react to changes in their rights.
In what follows, we will show that the key role explaining this behavior is held by the human
smugglers, whose indirect inﬂuence makes the interpretation of the available data much more dif-
ﬁcult. With asylum laws becoming increasingly restrictive, choosing illegality instead of applying
for asylum becomes an option for refugees that is not reﬂected in the statistics.
1.3 Human traﬃcking
Human smuggling or traﬃcking is an important feature of refugee migration. According to an Oxfam
(2005) estimation, 90% of asylum claimants enter Europe illegally. Most of them will have used the
services of traﬃckers or human smugglers who organize the trip. The German authorities estimate
that approximately 50% of asylum seekers were traﬃcked in 1997. In the Netherlands, ﬁgures reach
60-70%.13 According to a report published by the Dutch ministry for Justice, all refugees without
exception use the services of smugglers at at least one stage of their migration.14 In 1993, around
300 000 persons entered the European Union illegally, often with the help of traﬃckers.
12For example, in the UK, 4.7% of illegal immigrants caught by the police were expelled in 2002, while
11% of Iraqis and 55% of Yugoslavs whose asylum claims had been rejected were removed. Source: Home
Oﬃce (2003) and Home Oﬃce (2004).
13Morrisson and Crosland (2002), p. 16.
14Study quoted in Eﬁonayi-M¨ ader et al. (2001), p. 145.
7These numbers must be interpreted with precaution because of the double problem of a lack of
data on traﬃcking and the lack of statistical links between asylum claims statistics and those of
traﬃcked persons. There is however reason to believe in a strong link between human traﬃcking
and refugees. Traﬃcked persons indeed come mostly from refugee generating source countries.15
The dangers of human smuggling are well known. An example among many is the death of
58 Chinese refugees hidden in the back of a lorry transporting tomatoes in the British port of
Dover in June 2000. The hundreds of bodies found on the beaches of the Mediterranean each year
clearly illustrate the real dangers of this form of migration. However, by deﬁnition refugees also
face considerable danger if they do not migrate. Therefore, we will abstract from the dangers of the
migration in our model.
What is human traﬃcking and how does it work? We will clarify these questions before we
formalize the main characteristics of traﬃcking in the next section.
1.3.1 Deﬁnition of human traﬃcking
There is no international consensus on the distinction between smuggling and traﬃcking of human
beings. In addition to making persons enter a territory illegally (smuggling), traﬃcking includes
fraudulent proceedings and/or kidnapping, exploitation of people against their will. According to
this deﬁnition, a person seeking out smuggling services in full knowledge of what this implies is
not traﬃcked. However, we will see that refugee migration shows that there are cases in which
a person can have consented to the terms of migration, but still be exploited in the destination
country. A report published by the European Commission16 insists on the criterion of the existence
of victims of forced labor for the deﬁnition of human traﬃcking. According to this deﬁnition, using
smugglers can well imply the traﬃcking of persons, in spite of the existence of a contract. Since
both deﬁnitions are used and the distinction of traﬃcking and smuggling is relatively arbitrary in
the cases that refugees ﬁnd themselves in we will use the terminology indiscriminately. We will also
use the more neutral term of travel intermediary.
Note that while traﬃcking or smuggling persons is illegal, international customary law stipulates
that no refugee may be punished for entering a country illegally. The principle of refoulment in the
Geneva Convention prohibits states from deporting a refugee towards a state where he might be
threatened. Thus, refugees do not commit an illegal act by using smugglers.17
15Morrisson and Crosland (2002), p. 16.
16See European Commission (2004), p. 53.
17We do not model the risks faced by traﬃckers by committing an illegal action. It can be argued that
these risks are very low.
81.3.2 Traﬃcking Services
What do traﬃckers do? The traﬃcking of human beings has become an important component of
transnational organized crime, comparable and often linked to the networks traﬃcking drugs and
arms.18 The illegal services on oﬀer include one or several of the following:19
1. Facilitating illegal exit from a country, transit and or illegal entry into a diﬀerent country.
The methods used include
• Clandestine crossing of borders, on foot, with a guide;
• Crossing of borders by non-oﬃcial means of transport, like private cars, boats, hiding
in boats, trains or lorries;
• Crossing of borders by oﬃcial means of transport;
• Provision of fraudulent identity or travel documents, stolen or altered;
2. Provision of information on border and coastal controls, on asylum and immigration proce-
dures, including training migrants to deceive immigration and judicial authorities;
3. Provision of housing in countries of origin, transit and destination, and/or work in the country
of destination.
In our model, we do not focus on these diﬀerent functions, but simply assume that traﬃckers
make migration possible for refugees, and that migration is impossible to them without the help of
traﬃckers.
1.3.3 Financing of traﬃcking
Refugees can be poor. Nonetheless, traﬃcking takes place. In order to ﬁnance the migration and to
pay the traﬃcker, it is usual to use debt contracts that imply a repayment of debt in the country of
destination.20 A refugee ﬂeeing Iraq for the European Union in 2002 had to pay between 3.000 and
40.000 euros.21 Such sums are impossibly high for many persons requiring the service. Migrants
and their families have to sell their property and borrow money. Banking services are often not
available for persons who wish to ﬂee a country.
Thus, smugglers must step in to ﬁnance the migration. They encourage migrants to defer
payment to when they arrive in the destination country. Only a small sum (generally between 5%
and 20% of the total price) is paid before departure, noted share ε of the total price (¯ Φ) in the
18Morrisson and Crosland (2000), p. 42.
19Schloenhardt (2003), p. 19.
20Brolan (2003), p. 578-579, Friebel and Guriev (2006), p. 8, Ghosh (1998).
21See Jandl (2003) and Ghosh (1998), p. 31.
9model. The choice of destination is thus limited by the amount that a refugee can pay ex ante.22
The servicing of the debt, i.e. the payment of the remaining share of the price, (1−ε)¯ Φ, is ensured
in forced labor. Migrants are employed in prostitution, but also in sweat shops and in domestic
labor.23
It is very diﬃcult for refugees to escape the smuggler’s control. Methods consisting of threats,
locking up and taking away of papers make escaping forced labor a diﬃcult task. There exist state
programs of protection of traﬃcked persons in host countries. In exchange for information about
the traﬃcking network, victims are hidden.24 We assume that state protection is the only way to
escape traﬃckers.
Studies25 show that a large number of traﬃcking organizations operate in the same countries
of origin. We will therefore assume that traﬃckers work in a competitive environment. We assume
that refugees have perfect information on the traﬃcker’s practices and on asylum policies. Indeed,
traﬃckers’ reputations are made by the persons who were traﬃcked by them in the past. Refugees
know the reputation and only choose a traﬃcker who will let them free when the debt is paid back.
In the destination countries, other refugees and judicial advisors provide them with the necessary
information about asylum practices and policies for an estimation of the probability of success of
an asylum claim.26 We assume that traﬃckers and refugees are risk neutral.27
Traﬃckers are concerned with their reputation and will liberate traﬃcked persons once the debt
is paid back. Friebel and Guriev (2006) quote a study on Chinese on the Fujian province that states
that debt servicing takes between six months and four years, and 26 months on average. In other
cases, the extent of the debt and the vulnerability of traﬃcked persons due to their illegal status
lend traﬃckers a power of extortion that can exceed the contract.
Not all refugees are poor. Refugee crises are in fact of diﬀerent types that do not allow any
generalization across countries and time periods about the correlation between refugees’ resources
and their proﬁles. In certain situations, poorer groups are persecuted while in others, richer parts
22A testimony providing an example for this is provided in Middleton (2005), p. 30.
23Schloenhardt (1999).
24For an example, see the UK program of protection of the victims of traﬃcking, including safe housing.
It is used by asylum seekers: for example, 220 Eritreans claimed asylum in summer 2002 in order to escape
domestic servitude. See Crime Reduction Toolkit of the British government,
<http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/toolkits/tp0604.htm>
25See Middleton (2005), p. 31, IOM (2004), p. 105.
26If knowledge on asylum law is imperfect, as the literature suggests, then the impact of the asylum policy
variables is weakened or increased, without altering the results. In this case, the policy variables must be
interpreted as the perception of asylum. This does not change the model.
27One could argue that refugees are risk lovers because they are prepared to face the risks of the migration.
On the other hand, they could be risk averse because they ﬂee risks in their country in order to live in
security. It is not possible a priori to judge which, if any, of these arguments is closest to reality. Both risk
aversion and risk loving utility functions can be introduced into the model through the weighting of the rate
of expulsion without fundamentally changing the results.
10of the population or ethnic groups of all incomes are under attack. Those who are not poor can
ﬁnance their migration without having to enter into the debt-labor contract.
In the following section, we construct a model based on the characteristics of traﬃcking-based
asylum migration in order to study the eﬀects of the four diﬀerent types of policy listed above. We
will subsequently discuss these eﬀects in the light of the aims of governments, i.e. the reduction of
refugee ﬂows and the protection of victims of persecution.
2 Model
2.1 Model setup
There are three players, R and T, who are respectively the refugee and the travel intermediary, or
traﬃcker, and the state. The traﬃcker and the refugee take part in a four stage game (see Figure
2). In the ﬁrst period, the intermediary decides whether he wants to oﬀer the refugee a contract or
not. The contract is standard, with a ﬁxed prepayment. If he decides to accept the contract, the
refugee migrates to the destination country.
Here he can choose between applying for asylum and staying in illegality. In the case of the
asylum application, the host country accepts the claim with a probability of ρθi with ρθi ∈ [0,1]
. If he is refused, the refugee is expelled with the probability Π, again a policy variable. The
strategic interaction of the players is limited to the ﬁrst two periods. State action is based entirely
on probabilities.
The contract that the intermediary oﬀers to the refugee is comprised of two stages. First, the
refugee has to pay a ﬁxed part of the total price of the intermediary’s services. The intermediary
then makes it possible for him to migrate. On arrival in the country of destination, the refugee
must pay back his debt to the intermediary by working for him in illegal conditions. Then the
intermediary lets him free. However, the refugee can decide to renege on the debt and to apply
for asylum instead. The host country government protects asylum seekers from the pressure of
intermediaries, independently of the asylum status of the individual. Even if the asylum claim is
rejected and the refugee is removed, the intermediary has no means to reclaim the debt, since the
only way of paying it is by working in the intermediary’s sweatshops in the country of destination;
however, punishment for reneging on the debt contract is not excluded. For simplicity, we assume
that the debt contract is applied perfectly when the refugee does not apply for asylum, and that
the refugee is totally protected from paying back the debt when he does.
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Figure 2: Game tree
If no contract is oﬀered, payoﬀs are equal to zero for both players.28
U
T,R
0 = 0 (1)
If a contract is agreed upon, the intermediary charges a price ¯ Φ for his services in two successive
steps. The refugee makes a downpayment of a ﬁxed percentage ε of the total price. The rest of the
money, i.e. (1 − ε)¯ Φ is owed to the traﬃcker. The costs of transporting the refugee are denoted
C. They depend on the policies barring access to the destination country and are paid by the
intermediary. In all cases, if a contract is established, the intermediary’s payoﬀ is ε¯ Φ − C.
Two possible outcomes are important for the intermediary. If the refugee works for him illegally
28For the following three reasons, the refugee has no outside options. First, this assumption reﬂects the
compulsory nature of the refugee’s migration. The lack of choice about whether to emigrate is implicit in the
deﬁnition of the term refugee. Second, calculating the exterior options would entail important complications.
It would be necessary to evaluate the loss associated with imprisonment, torture and death and to compare
it to the gain derived from staying in one’s known environment and near one’s loved ones. (For a review
of the law and economics literature on the value of life and on the quality of life, see Viscusi (2005). This
literature does not apply here, because it concerns itself only with small risks. Per deﬁnition, refugees are
confronted with high risks.) Such calculations would be based on strong hypotheses. Finally, the standard
hypothesis of outside options normalized to zero for the refugee simpliﬁes the result without biasing it.
12and pays oﬀ his debt (1 − ε)¯ Φ, the intermediary’s payoﬀ is the total price ¯ Φ paid by the refugee,
minus the costs of the migration C.
UT
1 = ¯ Φ − C.
Alternatively, the refugee ﬁles an asylum claim and reneges on his debt. The intermediary’s
gain is limited to the initial payment ε¯ Φ, while he faces the same cost C for the migration.
UT
2,3,4 = ε¯ Φ − C.
The traﬃcker’s expected utility from a transaction depends on the share of refugees who pay
back the money owed, and on those who do not. f (θ) is the distribution of proﬁles in the population












The probability that the refugee does not pay back the debt is thus 1−F(¯ θ), which is the probability
that a refugee’s proﬁle is above the threshold proﬁle for claiming asylum. The traﬃcker’s expected
utility weights the outcomes with these probabilities. We ﬁnd:
EUT = F
￿¯ θ







ε¯ Φ − C
￿
A refugee who stays in illegality earns a wage wu and must pay the entire price ¯ Φ of the
migration. His total payoﬀ is
UR
1 = wu − ¯ Φ.
If he claims asylum, he receives a ﬁxed amount of asylum seeker beneﬁts β, which depend on
asylum policies. β is an asylum policy variable. It is a beneﬁt paid during the asylum procedure,
independently of its result. Recognized refugees have the right to work or to receive higher beneﬁts.
His other gains and losses depend on state decisions concerning his asylum claim and on expulsion.
If the state recognizes the refugee status, the refugee can ﬁnd work in the legal sector, earning a
wage wl = lwu with l > 1 the increase in income gained from not working illegally. The probability
of this outcome is ρθi and the payoﬀ for the refugee is
UR
2 = β − ε¯ Φ + wl.
Alternatively, the asylum claim is rejected. Remember that this decision does not automatically
imply expulsion; the removal rate Π depends on asylum policy. In the case of expulsion, the refugee
suﬀers the loss of D, variable composed of his exposure to possible persecution by the original
13persecuting party and the intermediary, and of the disappointment at the failed migration.29 The
refugee’s utility amounts to
UR
3 = β − ε¯ Φ − D.
If he is not expelled, he works in the illegal sector. His payoﬀ is
UR
4 = β − ε¯ Φ + wu.
When applying for asylum, the refugee’s expected payoﬀ is thus:
EUR = ρθi (β + wl) − (1 − ρθi)[Π(β − D) + (1 − Π)(β + wu)] − ε¯ Φ.
2.2 Equilibria
Backward induction determines the conditions under which the refugee will apply for asylum instead
of working to pay oﬀ his debt, and the conditions under which the traﬃcker will oﬀer a contract to
the refugee.
In the second period, the refugee compares his utility from staying illegal UR
1 to his expected
utility from applying for asylum EUR.
EUR = UR
1
⇒ ρθi (β + wl) + (1 − ρθi)[π (β − D) + (1 − π)(β + wu)] − ε¯ Φ = wu − ¯ Φ
The threshold proﬁle above which it is rational to apply for asylum rather than to stay illegal
is:
¯ θ =
−β − (1 − ε)¯ Φ + πD + wu(1 + l(Π − 1))
ρ(πD + l(Π − 2)wu)
(2)
with ¯ θ such that θi > ¯ θ : the refugee claims asylum, and θi < ¯ θ : he stays illegally. Equation (2)
shows that the level of the threshold ¯ θ depends on the expected income from the legal and illegal
sectors (wu and wl), the price of being traﬃcked ¯ Φ, the loss from expulsion D, and on the three
types of asylum policy: the probability of removal Π, asylum seeker’s beneﬁts β, and the function
linking the probability of a claim being accepted to the individual proﬁle ρθi. We will see that
the the marginal cost of transporting a refugee imposed by access policies, noted C, inﬂuences ¯ θ
indirectly via the price ¯ Φ.
In the ﬁrst period, the intermediary only oﬀers a contract to the refugee if his expected utility
from the contract EUT is at least equal to zero, that is, at least as high as his utility UT
0 in the
absence of a contract.
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Figure 3: Distribution of choice of refugees
EUT ≥ UT ⇒ F
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(εΦ − C) ≥ 0
Including the traﬃcker’s proﬁt constraint, we ﬁnd the following threshold price below which the








¯ Φ is threshold price such that if Φ < ¯ Φ : the traﬃcker oﬀers no contract, and if Φ ≥ ¯ Φ : the
traﬃcker oﬀers a contract to the refugee. Only refugees who are able to make the downpayment ε¯ Φ
can undertake the migration.
The thresholds of proﬁles from which refugees apply for asylum
￿¯ θ
￿
and from which traﬃckers




are presented in Figure 3. The wealth of the refugees is plotted
on the horizontal axis. All refugees whose initial wealth exceeds ε¯ Φ can migrate. All those who
cannot make this downpayment are excluded from migration.
The vertical axis plots the types of refugees. Of those who can migrate, only individual types
θi > ¯ θ claim asylum. Those whose type is inferior to the threshold type ¯ θ opt for illegality instead
of asylum. The arrows show the impact of the movement of the thresholds for wealth and proﬁles
on the distribution of migrants.
153 Discussion
3.1 The eﬀects of restrictive asylum policy measures on refugee
choices and option
What is the eﬀect of the diﬀerent types of policies on the thresholds? The asylum policies on
removal, beneﬁts and recognition rates have a direct eﬀect on the decision of a refugee to apply for
asylum or to stay illegally. They also have an indirect eﬀect on price ﬁxed by the traﬃcker, because
they inﬂuence the probability that the price will actually be paid.
Access policies, on the other hand, have a direct eﬀect on the threshold price and on the amount
of the ﬁrst payment, and an indirect eﬀect on the choice of whether to apply for asylum. Access
restrictions increase the costs to the traﬃcker and they increase the debt of the traﬃcked. As a
consequence, claiming asylum becomes more interesting because a higher debt service is avoided.
There thus exists an inverse relationship between the threshold levels ε¯ Φ and ¯ θ: the more the
government tries to reduce access, the higher the probability that a person in the country will apply
for asylum, and vice versa.
Asylum policies
∆C > 0 ∆β < 0 ∆π > 0 ∆ρ < 0
∆No migration > 0 < 0 Q 0 < 0
∆Illegality < 0 > 0 Q 0 > 0
∆Asylum claims Q 0 Q 0 Q 0 Q 0
Table 1: Impact of asylum policy variables on outcome probabilities
Table 1 summarizes the signs of the impacts of the modiﬁcation (toughening) of asylum policy
variables on the probability of refugees to ﬁnd themselves in one of the three outcome situations
no migration, illegality, asylum claim (read horizontally). Thus, an increase in access costs leads
to a larger share of refugees (or a larger probability for one refugee) for whom migration and ﬂight
are impossible. It reduces the share of persons in illegality and has an indeﬁnite eﬀect on the share
of asylum seekers. Reductions in social beneﬁts β and in the recognition rate ρ have the opposite
eﬀects, whereas the eﬀects of removal policies are indeterminate. The sign of the impact of asylum
policies on the share of asylum seekers cannot be determined a priori in for any of the measures.
3.1.1 Eﬀects on the possibility to ﬂee
The policies aiming to prevent access to the territory increase the marginal cost of immigration,
and they consequently increase the price paid by the refugee, ¯ Φ. The more restrictive policies of
this type are, the more refugees cannot pay the initial amount for migration ε¯ Φ. The other types of
16restrictive asylum policies, by making asylum claims less attractive, decrease the risk that a refugee
will default on the debt payment. Thus, the price of migration sinks, making migration possible
for more persons. An increase in earnings in the illegal sector or a decrease in earnings in the legal
sector have the same eﬀect. They make debt servicing relatively more attractive and they thus
increase the number of persons that can be transported.
3.1.2 Eﬀects on illegality
A refugee who has suﬃcient ressources to pay ε¯ Φ and whose proﬁle θi is too low to make him prefer
an asylum claim (θi < ¯ θ) ﬁnds himself in a situation of forced labor while paying back the debt. The
probability of ﬁnding oneself in this situation is increased by all restrictive asylum measures except
those toughening removal access. The latter policy decreases the number of traﬃcked persons, while
the other types of policies render the situation of illegality more attractive relative to claiming
asylum. Higher earnings in the illegal sector, lower legal earnings and a decrease in the debt
(1 − e) have the same eﬀect. An increase in the probability of being expulsed can either increase or
decrease the probability of ﬁnding oneself in the situations of servitude or of impossibility of ﬂeeing
the country depending on the values of wu and of D.
3.1.3 Eﬀects on asylum claims
Finally, the consequences on asylum claims, the speciﬁc aim of these policies, are undetermined.
Asylum claimants are those who can make the initial payment and whose proﬁle is superior to the
threshold (θi > ¯ θ). The dissuasive eﬀect of the policies and of the other variables on the refugees
is undermined by the lower risk faced by the traﬃckers, who traﬃc more persons as a consequence.
Without further deﬁnition of the proﬁle θi and of access to resources to make the initial payment
it is impossible to predict which of the two eﬀects is more important.
3.2 The eﬀectiveness of restrictive asylum policy measures
3.2.1 Restrictive policies and the aim of reducing the inﬂow of refugees
Do restrictive measures lead to a reduction of the inﬂow of refugees? We have found that only
one type of policy measure has this eﬀect: access control increases the share of persons who do
not migrate. Tougher acceptance and beneﬁts policies here have the opposite eﬀect. They make
it less attractive for migrants to renege on their debt contract, which has the eﬀect that traﬃckers
charge a lower price to make migration possible. This, in turn, makes it possible for more refugees
to migrate. Expulsion policies have contradictory eﬀects for which it is not possible to make an a
priori prediction on whether they reduce the inﬂow of refugees.
Moreover, the eﬀects on the number of inﬂowing migrants do not translate directly into the same
eﬀects for asylum applications. Indeed, we have shown that the eﬀects of all types of asylum policies
17on asylum applications is a priori uncertain due to contradictory inﬂuences. As a consequence,
policy makers cannot inﬂuence whether their policies will increase or decrease the number of asylum
seekers. Instead, the eﬀects of their policies will depend on exogenous factors like the distribution
of proﬁles and wealth in the migrant population. Thus, restrictive asylum policies to not reliably
achieve the end of reducing the inﬂow of migrants.
3.2.2 Restrictive policies and humanitarian considerations
Do restrictive asylum policies achieve other, humanitarian goals? Do they ensure protection to a
greater number of people, or better protection for immigrants and asylum seekers?
None of this is the case. While some measures of asylum policies do increase the number of
persons who can migrate, none of these reduces the number of persons in illegality. The increase in
migration does therefore not lead to an increase in protection; rather, it leads to an increase in the
number of persons who as illegal residents are excluded from state protection. Also, the increase
in total migration does not aﬀect especially bona ﬁde migrants. Instead, wealth is still the factor
determining whether a refugee can migrate or not.
The toughening of asylum policies also fails to achieve the goal of providing better protection
to those who do apply for asylum. We have seen that it does not achieve the reduction of asylum
applications that would have been a precondition to improving applicants’ protection. What is
more, the living conditions as well as the chance for acceptance and the probability of expulsion of
those who apply are worsened.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied whether in a world in which traﬃcking is a determinant feature of
migration the toughening of asylum policy measures leads to the proclaimed goals of policy makers,
i.e. humanitarian goals and the reduction of immigration and asylum applications. We have found
thata priori, asylum policy measures to not lead to the intended outcomes. While their outcome
is uncertain, especially regarding asylum claims, they can also lead to to unwelcome eﬀects, i.e.
an increase in migration and in asylum claims, and a reduction in the protection even of bona ﬁde
refugees.
Our model also shows why empirical studies come to contradictory or non-signiﬁcant results
concerning the impact of the diﬀerent types of asylum policies on migration and asylum ﬂows.
There are indeed factors at work that pull in diﬀerent directions because the traﬃcker has an
interest to bind the migrant to the debt-contract. Our model shows that future empirical research
should try to take into account the distribution of wealth among refugees as well as their “proﬁle”
for the results to be able to be interpreted.
Hannah Arendt is quoted as saying that it is true that one cannot make an omelette without
18breaking eggs, but one can break a great number of eggs without making an omelett30. It seems,
from the above analysis, that indeed many eggs are broken - many rights have been reduced -
without achieving to make the omelette - the goals of asylum policy.
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